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Abstract
Remuneration rates of German nursing homes are prospectively negotiated between 
long-term care insurance (LTCI) and social assistance on the one side and nursing ho-
mes on the other. They diﬀ  er considerably across regions while there is no evidence 
for substantial diﬀ  erences in care provision. This paper explains the diﬀ  erences in the 
remuneration rates by observable characteristics of the nursing home, its residents and 
its region with a special focus on the largest federal state North-Rhine-Westphalia, in 
which the most expensive nursing homes are located. We use data from the German Fe-
deral Statistical Oﬃ   ce for 2005 on all nursing homes that oﬀ  er full-time residential care 
for the elderly. We ﬁ  nd that diﬀ  erences in remuneration rates can partly be explained 
by exogenous factors. Controls for residents, nursing homes, and district characteris-
tics explain roughly 30% of the price diﬀ  erence; 40% can be ascribed to a regionally 
diﬀ  erent kind of negotiation between nursing homes and LTCI. 30% of the raw price 
diﬀ  erence remains unexplained by observable characteristics.
JEL Classiﬁ  cation: I11, I18
Keywords: Nursing homes; determinants of remuneration rates; regional price diﬀ  e-
rences
October 2010
1  Roman Mennicken, RWI and University of Cologne; Boris Augurzky, RWI; Heinz Rothgang, 
University of Duisburg-Essen; Jürgen Wasem, Zentrum für Sozialpolitik, Bremen. – All correspon-
dence to Roman Mennicken, RWI, Hohenzollernstr. 1–3, 45128 Essen, Germany, E-Mail: roman.
mennicken@rwi-essen.de1 Introduction
The long-term care industry has experienced a dramatic growth over the last decade in
Germany. In 2007 2.25 million people were in need of long-term care (LTC) (Statistisches
Bundesamt 2007). They are looked after either by their relatives at home (1.03 million),
by professional outpatient services (together with relatives) (0.50 million), or are residents
in nursing homes (0.71 million). In 1999 2.02 million people were in need of long-term care.
Between 1999 and 2007 the number of residents in nursing homes had the steepest increase
of 25% from 0.57 million in 1999 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2001) to 0.71 million today.
The number of nursing homes went up from 8,900 in 1999 to 11,000 in 2007. Thus, the
relevance of residential care in nursing homes has increased considerably in the last years.
As residential care is the most expensive form for the long-term care insurance (LTCI),
a public debate on the prices for residential care has started in recent years (Roth and
Rothgang 1999, Rothgang et al. 2005, H¨ acker et al. 2008). In Germany, remuneration rates
are the result of a collective bargaining process between the LTCI and social assistance on
behalf of payers and the nursing home. Residents do not participate in the negotiations.
Remuneration rates are negotiated for each nursing home separately. Then, the prices are
ﬁxed until the next bargaining round only to be called in by the provider.
Since introduction in 1996 LTCI distinguishes between three levels of care (CL) with
increasing severity of care: level I to level III. The level is formally assessed by an inde-
pendent Medical Review Board of the Statutory Health Insurance Funds. The cost of care
(CC) is lowest in level I and highest in level III. Within a level it is equal for all residents of
a given nursing home. In addition to the cost of care residents pay for board and lodging
(BL) and for investment costs (IC) that have not been publicly ﬁnanced. Residents in a
single room pay higher IC while residents in double or larger rooms pay less (Rothgang and
Igl 2007). In total, the resident pays the sum of CC, BL, and IC to the nursing home. For
a given level of care, but independent of the remuneration rate of the nursing home, the
LTCI refunds part of the total costs (see Table 1), i.e. the residents pays the gap between
the remuneration rate and the beneﬁt of the LTCI, which is on average around 50%. The
gap gets larger with higher remuneration rates and vice versa. If residents cannot pay the
total gap, their children relatives or –if neither can pay– social assistance has to step in.
Table 1: Daily beneﬁts of the LTCI for full-time residential care (in EUR)
Level I Level II Level III
1996 - 2007 33.65 42.07 47.11
2008 - 2009 33.65 42.07 48.36
2010 - 2011 33.65 42.07 49.67
2012 - 2015 33.65 42.07 50.99
Notes: Table derived from Social Code Book XI ( 43) assuming 30.4 days per month.
Beneﬁts increased in 2008 on the 1st of July, for 2010 and 2012 it will be the 1st of January.
4The remuneration rates (prices) of nursing homes diﬀer considerably across regions
(Augurzky et al. 2006) –see Figure 1 and Table 2– although the concept of long-term
care is deﬁned uniformly by social law. Clusters of regions with high prices are clearly
distinguishable. The most expensive nursing homes can be found in the federal state of
North-Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) and in some regions of Baden-W¨ urttemberg and Bavaria.
The least expensive nursing homes are located in Eastern Germany.
Table 2: Average daily price level II including B&L (in EUR) by federal states
(2005)
Price level II SD N
including B&L
North Rhine-Westphalia 83.35 6.78 1667
Hamburg 82.54 13.50 146
Baden-W¨ urttemberg 78.83 10.25 1048
Bremen 78.01 9.78 79
Bavaria 77.24 9.22 1277
Berlin 76.94 7.62 249
Schleswig Holstein 72.82 12.88 529
Hesse 72.56 7.92 560
Rhineland-Palatinate 71.91 5.10 389
Saarland 71.10 7.32 118
Lower Saxony 66.82 6.99 1202
Saxony-Anhalt 64.76 6.95 310
Mecklenburg Western Pomerania 62.23 8.28 171
Brandenburg 62.13 3.39 255
Thuringia 61.33 5.76 215
Saxony 57.70 2.98 488
Note: Data refers to nursing homes oﬀering full-time residential care for the elderly.
The question arises whether and how the observed price diﬀerences can be explained.
International literature focusses on costs (Nyman 1994, Norton et al. 2000, Mukamel and
Spector 2002, Mukamel et al. 2005) or proﬁts (Knox et al. 1999) of nursing homes. Due to
the unique price setting mechanism in Germany we cannot rely on international empirical
studies. In particular, there might be ineﬃciencies in the bargaining process. The LTCI
as the leader of the negotiations for the payer side has no incentive to negotiate for cost
savings as any markups are totally at the expense of the residents or social assistance
(Rothgang et al. 2005). Moreover, competition between nursing homes does not fully work:
First, only recently public information on quality became available1. Second, mobility of
1The LTC reform in 2008 (Pﬂegeweiterentwicklungsgesetz 2008) increased transparency with
regards to quality. From 2008 on, every nursing home is assessed yearly by the Medical Review
Board of the Statutory Health Insurance Funds. Results are presented as school grades and are
publicly available.
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Figure 1: Average daily price for care level II (including B&L and excluding IC)
(2005)
6new residents is typically very low such that they choose one of the few providers in their
vicinity. In case of sudden need for residential care (e.g. after hospital discharge) the choice
is reduced even further, because there is often only one local provider available. Third,
for some residents social assistance pays the remaining gap between the actual price and
LTCI beneﬁts (H¨ acker et al. 2008).
This paper analyzes the diﬀerences in prices between nursing homes in NRW and the
comparable states of Baden-W¨ urttemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, Lower Saxony, and Rhineland-
Palatinate by taking into account regional conditions, nursing home characteristics, and
resident structure. The analyzes are based on a full sample of more than 6,000 nurs-
ing homes in 2005. The following section presents the data and outlines the estimation
strategy. Section 3 provides the results and section 4 concludes.
2 Data and estimation strategy
We use data from the Research Data Centers of the Federal Statistical Oﬃce (FSO)
and the statistical oﬃces of the states that comprise a full sample of all 10,424 German
nursing homes in 2005 (Forschungsdatenzentren der Statistischen ¨ Amter des Bundes und
der L¨ ander 2007). They also include information on the more than 676,000 residents.
Every second year, at 15th of December, nursing homes are obliged to provide information
about their ownership, total number of resident places and other structural information,
e.g. the average number of beds per room, being part of a hospital, rehabilitation center or
another facility, and whether they additionally oﬀer home care. There are three diﬀerent
types of ownership: private-for-proﬁt, private not-for-proﬁt, i.e. nursing homes owned
by e.g. churches or charity groups and public ones. Furthermore, the data allow us to
distinguish between nursing homes which provide care for the elderly, for people with
disabilities, for mentally disordered people, or for the severely-ill, and between full, short-
and part-time residential care. Part-time residential care means staying either over night
or during the day only.
Moreover, for each nursing home we have information about the number of residents,
their age, gender, the nursing care level and the remuneration rate. We refer to the total
costs of care (TCC) as the sum of CC and BL. TCC diﬀers by the level of care I to III
as does CC. In order to measure the average price level of a nursing home i we build the
average total cost of care (ACC) as the weighted average of TCC I, II, and III. Weights
are the national average fraction of residents in level I, II, and III, respectively. In 2005,
on average 35% of all residents were in care level I, 44% in level II, and 21% in level III:
ACCi =0 .35 × CC1i +0 .44 × CC2i +0 .21 × CC3i + BLi. (1)
We refrain from using the individual distribution of the residents in each nursing home
to avoid endogeneity problems: the distribution of the residents might depend on the
7remuneration rates for each CL. Additionally, nursing homes with e.g. low remuneration
rates in all CLs could turn out to be expensive, because they have a higher proportion of
residents in CL III, thus, resulting in a high average price due to the weights per CL used
for calculating the average.
Finally, the data contains information on the nursing homes’ staﬀ. For each employee
we can distinguish between full- and part time contracts. There are four diﬀerent working
time intervals: “full time”, “more than 50%”, “less than 50%”, and “employees earning
less than 400 EUR per month”. Using the oﬃcial conversion factors of the FSO, we are able
to approximately calculate full-time equivalents (FTEs). Additionally, we complement the
data with regional information about the administrative district. The Federal Oﬃce for
Building and Regional Planning provides rich information about the 439 German districts
including income and the degree of rurality. Rurality indicates the average share of citizens
in a district living in a rural area. Average regional income is deﬁned as the average
disposable income per citizen and year in euro. We also include the share of private-for-
proﬁt nursing homes in a district as we expect private-for-proﬁt nursing homes to increase
price competition.
We focus on nursing homes oﬀering full-time residential care for the elderly (in total
9087 nursing homes in 2005). We only include nursing homes in the six federal states
mentioned above (6184 homes) excluding outliers: nursing homes with more than two
FTEs per resident (24 observations) and those with inconsistencies in the price information
(19 observations). This leaves us with a total sample size of 6143 nursing homes.
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of the data for NRW and the other ﬁve federal
states. The comparison states are shown individually and as a whole. The average cost of
care is highest in NRW with 81.03 EUR per day and lowest in Lower Saxony (66.64 EUR
per day). There is considerable variation in the share of residents by care level across
the federal states. In contrast, the average age of the residents is fairly similar. FTE per
resident is highest in NRW and Baden-W¨ urttemberg - 7% more than in Lower Saxony. It
is striking that North-Rhine Westphalia has the lowest share of private-for-proﬁt nursing
homes (20.2%). In Rhineland-Palatinate over 65% of the nursing homes is part of another
(health care) facility compared to 20% in Lower Saxony. Furthermore, there is substantial
variation across the federal states in beds per room and in the size of the nursing homes
measured in number of places oﬀered. Finally, NRW has by far the most urban areas and



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10For a deeper understanding of the price setting mechanism in diﬀerent federal states
we conducted 25 in-depth telephone or personal interviews with individuals taking part
in negotiation processes on the payer or on the provider side2. Interviews were semi-
structured, providing subjective information regarding inter alia speciﬁcs in each federal
state’s method of the collective bargaining process. All interviews were conducted in 2007
and lasted between one and two hours. Notes were taken with the permission of each
respondent3. The interviews revealed that the payers are supposed to take on a “softer”
negotiation style in NRW than in other federal states. In general, the negotiations in
NRW are based more on the internal cost structure of the respective nursing home while
external benchmarks, i.e. comparisons with other providers, are less often used (Augurzky
et al. 2008).
In a least-squared framework we model the average price of care ACCik as follows
ACCik = α + β1Nik + β2Rik + β3Hik + β4Dk +  ik. (2)
The index i refers to the nursing home and k to the district. Nik indicates the federal
state of North-Rhine-Westphalia. Rik includes the residents’ characteristics: the share of
residents by the care levels and the average age and age squared of the residents. Hik
contains characteristics of the nursing home: FTE per resident, kind of ownership, beds
per room, dummies for size, being part of another facility, and provision of part-time or
home care. The district vector Dk bears the share of private nursing homes, the degree of
rurality, and the average income per citizen. Finally,  ik is the stochastic error term.
We start with the simplest regression model which only includes the dummy variable
Nik for NRW. This regression shows the raw diﬀerence in ACCik between NRW and the
other federal states. Stepwise we expand the model with the resident, nursing home, and
market characteristics. This allows us to assess the impact of additional variables on the
price diﬀerence captured by the coeﬃcient of Nik in the simplest speciﬁcation. Mukamel
and Spector (2000) showed diﬀering eﬀects of ownership in diﬀerent regions. Therefore, we
include an interaction between Nik and ownership. In the ﬁnal speciﬁcation we also include
an interaction term of FTE per resident with Nik, because staﬀ is the most important cost
driver for nursing homes, which should be reﬂected in higher prices. If the institutions in
NRW indeed negotiate diﬀerently concerning personnel costs as suggested by the results
of the interviews, this interaction should capture diﬀerences in regards to staﬃng costs.
2These interviews were conducted by a consulting agency and the co-author Heinz Rothgang
as part of a commissioned research project of the Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Welfare of
North Rhine-Westphalia in 2007.
3For full results of these interviews see Augurzky et al. (2008).
113R e s u l t s
Table 4 shows the regression results for ten model speciﬁcations. In model 1 the raw
diﬀerence in ACC between NRW and the comparison states is estimated at 8.97 EUR.
The ACC in the comparison states amounts to 72.13 EUR and in NRW to 81.10 EUR, i.e.
12.4% higher. Step by step we include further variables and have a look at the estimate
of the coeﬃcient of the NRW-dummy. If it decreases the added variables explain part of
the price diﬀerence.
In model 2 we include the individual distribution of the residents. The price diﬀerence
increases to 9.01 EUR as in NRW there is a larger share of less severe cases than in the other
regions. Therefore, NRW should actually be less expensive. Controlling for the average
age of the residents (model 3) has no impact on the price diﬀerence. The small non-linear
eﬀect of age appears to be negligible as the threshold at which age increases the price
again lies around 74.5 years. Given that the average age in our sample is around 82 years,
a higher age of the residents leads c.p. to a higher price. In model 4 we add ownership,
with private not-for-proﬁt nursing homes being the baseline. The price diﬀerence drops
to 7.85 EUR. Adding FTEs per resident (Model 5) the diﬀerence does hardly alter. The
ownership structure seems to explain about 15% of the price diﬀerences between NRW
and the comparison states. Controlling for other characteristics of the nursing homes like
being part of another facility, provision of community care or part-time care, and beds per
room (model 6) and size (model 7), the price diﬀerences increases slightly to 8.09 EUR
and drops to 7.88 EUR, respectively.
Once we add the regional control variables (model 8), the price diﬀerence drops by
1.70 EUR in comparison to model 7. As expected, the share of private homes, which
might indicate stronger competition, signiﬁcantly decreases the prices. So does the degree
of rurality. Higher disposable income in the district increases the average price. Taking all
these factors into account we can explain around 30% of the raw price diﬀerence between








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14In model 9 we include the interactions of ownership and location. The interaction
between private-for-proﬁt and the NRW-dummy shows a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect, i.e.
the price diﬀerence between public nursing homes and private-for-proﬁt nursing homes is
smaller in NRW than in other federal states. The price diﬀerence decreases by another
0.34 EUR. In the last model we include the interaction between FTE per resident and
NRW. The interaction is highly signiﬁcant, i.e. more FTEs in NRW increase remuneration
rates signiﬁcantly. The price diﬀerence drops by nearly 3.20 EUR. Thus, this interaction
explains by far the most part of the price diﬀerence between NRW and the comparison
states. However, the NRW-dummy still remains signiﬁcantly positive at about 2.60 EUR.
In sum, observable characteristics explain about 70% of the raw price diﬀerence between
NRW and the other states. 30% remains unexplained.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Since remuneration rates are not the result of a free market process, but are negotiated
between nursing homes and the LTCI and social assistance, the question arises what factors
determine the large price diﬀerences between nursing homes in Germany. This paper is
the ﬁrst that analyzes the determinants of remuneration rates in particular with respect
to North-Rhine-Westphalia, where –on average– prices are more than 12% higher than in
other large West German federal states.
Characteristics of residents, nursing homes, and the respective district explain roughly
30% of the price diﬀerence. Once we take the interaction between number of FTE per
resident and NRW as well as ownership and NRW into account we can explain another
40% of the diﬀerence. We think that a diﬀerent kind of negotiation in NRW explains the
large impact of the interaction term of FTE and the NRW-dummy: In NRW additional
personnel costs of nursing homes might be more easily accepted as a driver of prices in
negotiations with the LTCI and social assistance than in other federal states. In other
states higher staﬃng levels tend to be regarded as a matter for providers. If they are
exceeding regional norm patterns they are not considered in the negotiation process for
setting daily rates. For example in Lower Saxony, the less expensive federal state, price
negotiations strongly take into account the prices of local competitors –independent of the
internal cost structure of the negotiating nursing home. This interpretation is in line with
the explanation we received in the interviews (Augurzky et al. 2008). Finally, roughly
30% of the raw price diﬀerence remains unexplained by observable characteristics.
In 2005 there have been around 150000 residents living in nursing homes located
in North-Rhine Westphalia. In total, residents, their relatives or social assistance pay
between 40 and 240 million EUR per year more for nursing homes than residents in
comparable states. We have calculated these ﬁgures with the upper and lower bound of the
95% conﬁdence interval of the point estimate of the NRW-Dummy in the last estimation
model. Using the point estimate itself the sum adds up to around 140 Mio EUR per year.
It is up to the public and the policy makers to decide whether they are willing to pay this
15amount of money for what an interviewee called “institutional inheritance: Even before
introduction of the LTCI in Germany, prices of nursing homes in NRW have been higher.
Nowadays, there are extrapolated.”
Some limitations remain. As we cannot measure the quality of care it is not possible
to judge whether price diﬀerences can be justiﬁed by diﬀerent quality levels. Higher staﬀ
numbers in NRW can be interpreted as better structural quality. To identify whether this
transforms into better outcome quality, which alone would justify higher prices, is left to
further research. Additionally, we have not been able to test empirically whether nursing
homes in NRW pay wages according to the collective wage agreements more so than in
other states. A separate analysis with census data showed a 6% higher income of nurses
in NRW compared to the other federal states (Augurzky et al. 2008). However, this eﬀect
would also be captured in the interaction eﬀect between FTEs and the NRW-dummy. We
cannot disentangle the eﬀects of diﬀerent negotiation styles and generally paying higher
wages in NRW. While the ﬁrst would be a clear ineﬃciency in the system, the latter is
ambiguous. Finally, future analyzes should also incorporate investment costs, be expanded
to all federal states and use data for more years to apply panel data methods.
16References
Augurzky, B., L. Borchert, R. Deppisch, S. Krolop, R. Mennicken, M. Preus, H. Roth-
gang, M. Stocker-Mller, J. Wasem. 2008. Heimentgelte bei der stationren Pﬂege in
Nordrhein-Westfalen - Ein Bundeslndervergleich. Materialien 44, RWI, Essen.
Augurzky, B., S. Krolop, H. Schmidt, S. Terkatz. 2006. Pﬂegeversicherung, Rating und
Demograﬁe. Materialien 27, RWI, Essen.
Forschungsdatenzentren der Statistischen ¨ Amter des Bundes und der L¨ ander. 2007.
Pﬂegestatistik. Antragsnummer 564-2007.
H¨ acker, J., B. K¨ o n i g ,B .R a ﬀ e l h ¨ uschen, M. Wernicke, J. Wettke. 2008. Eﬃzienzreserven
in der stationren Pﬂege in Deutschland: Versuch einer Quantiﬁzierung und Implika-
tionen fr die Reform der Gesetzlichen Pﬂegeversicherung. Zeitschrift f¨ ur Wirtschaft-
spolitik 57(1) 92–116.
Knox, K. J., E. C. Blankmeyer, J.R. Stutzman. 1999. Relative economic eﬃciency in texas
nursing facilities: a proﬁt function analysis. Journal of Economics and Finance 23(3)
199–213.
Mukamel, D. B., W. D. Spector. 2000. Nursing home costs and risk adjusted outcome
measure of quality. Medical Care 38(1) 78–89.
Mukamel, D. B., W. D. Spector. 2002. The competitive nature of the nursing home
industry: price mark ups and demand elasticities. Applied Economics 34(4) 413 –
420.
Mukamel, D. B., W. D. Spector, A. Bajorska. 2005. Nursing home spending patterns in
the 1990s: The role of nursing home competition and excess demand. Health Services
Research 40(4) 1040–1055.
Norton, E. C., J. C. Anthony, J. P. Newhouse. 2000. Chapter 17 long-term care. Handbook
of Health Economics, vol. Volume 1, Part 2. Elsevier, 955–994.
Nyman, J. 1994. The eﬀects of market concentration and excess demand on the price of
nursing home care. The Journal of Industrial Economics 42(2) 193–204.
Roth, G., H. Rothgang. 1999. Die Auswirkungen des Pﬂege-Versicherungsgesetzes auf
die Entwicklung der Heimentgelte. Zeitschrift f¨ ur Gesundheitswissenschaften 7(4)
306–335.
Rothgang, H., G. Igl. 2007. Long-term care in germany. The Japanese Journal of Social
Security Policy 6(1) 54–58.
Rothgang, H., J. Wasem, S. Greß. 2005. Verg¨ utungsﬁndung auf dem station¨ aren Pﬂege-
markt in Nordrhein-Westfalen Bestandaufnahme und Alternativen. Report, Univer-
sit¨ at Duisburg-Essen, Essen.
Statistisches Bundesamt. 2001. Kurzbericht: Pﬂegestatistik 1999 Pﬂege im Rahmen der
Pﬂegeversicherung - Deutschlandergebnisse. Report, Bonn.
Statistisches Bundesamt. 2007. Pﬂegestatistik 2005: Pﬂege im Rahmen der Pﬂegever-
sicherung Deutschlandergebnisse. Report, Wiesbaden.
17